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AKRoN LAW REVIEW
SELECTED CAMPAIGN TACTICS
PERMITTED UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
INTRODUCTIONO BTAINING STATUS as the recognized representative of the workers in a
plant or factory is usually achieved through a representation election
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.). 1 The first
step in the process for the union is to obtain a majority of authorization
cards from the workers. Then the union will usually demand recognition and
file a petition for election with the N.L.R.B.2 In order to file a petition, the
union must have authorization cards from at least 30% of the bargaining
unit.' At this point a date is set for the election by the N.L.R.B. and the
election campaign commences.
Needless to say, at this point the union is striving to persuade a majority
of the employees to vote "Union," and management is attempting to persuade
a majority to vote "No Union." A multitude of tactics' can be employed
by both sides to obtain their objectives; some are permissible, some are not.
Since it is the Board's responsibility to conduct and supervise the election,
the Board serves as a neutral third party in deciding the propriety of conduct
if an objection to the election is filed by either party. The Board's role
in this capacity is vital to the integrity of the election process as the effect
of an election is far reaching. Simply put, the union by winning embarks upon
a course of collective bargaining with the employer. On the other hand,
a management victory results in maintaining the status quo, i.e. no union.
The thrust of this discussion is to concentrate on several tactics
utilized mainly by employers (Soliciting and/or Remedying Grievances
during an Election Campaign and Interrogation and Polling) and a tactic
used solely by the union (Waiver of Initiation Fees). Following these dis-
cussions, a chapter will be devoted to Interference with the Board's Election
Process by both parties. Finally, the issue of Misrepresentations in an
"There are two other methods to achieve recognition, but they are not used as frequently
as the representation election. One method is the card check and the other is the strike.
The employer will rarely acquiese to card check recognition because a union will usually
be able to muster enough signatures and therefore win. As to the strike, there is a consider-
able amount of risk involved when the union threatens strike. It may well be that there will
not be enough support to be successful. For these reasons the usual course of action is
to utilize the N.L.R.B. conducted election.
2n reality there should be a small time lapse as the employer may choose to honor the
demand (very unlikely).
3N.L.R.B. Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (a) (1975).
4 Tactics other than those discussed herein include solicitation, distribution, use of movies
and poster, captive audience speeches, union buttons, violence, racial and sex prejudices,
and surveillance.
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election campaign will be discussed in depth as this issue is very important
today in light of the ever changing approach of the Board over the past
several decades.
I. SOLICITING AND/OR REMEDYING GRIEVANCES
DURING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The soliciting and remedying of grievances during an organizational
campaign is a method that has been used by management to thwart the
union's quest for members. Often a union is able to gain the upper hand
in the drive for recognition due to the past practices and policies of man-
agement that has resulted in employee dissatisfaction. Recognizing the
impact of possible recognition, the employer will quickly move to halt the
drive of the union by rectifying worker complaints. Conduct of this nature
constitutes interference with the organizational activities of the employees.'
Generally, the manner in which management solicits grievances is through
a series of meetings or the use of a suggestion box.
In H. L. Meyer Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,6 the Eighth Circuit sustained the
Board's finding that the suggestion box was designed and did interfere with
the organizational activities of the employees. The idea for the suggestion
box originated with two employees, but the President of the company used
the box to offset the gains made by the union concerning management's
policies. After questions were submitted to management, answers were posted
on the bulletin boards. Typical of the questions and answers are as follows:
Q: I heard that the employees of the other plants have been there 10
yrs. or over are getting 3 weeks paid vacation. Is this correct?
A: Yes. This year they will get 3 weeks pay, but only 2 weeks off.
During a Union organization campaign the law prohibits us from
changing employee's benefits; such is the case at H. L. Meyer Co.
Q: As I understand that the other plants such as Butler and Versailles
get their raise prior to Feb. 1. Is there a possible chance that we
the employees of H. L. Meyer Co. would get back pay if by chance
the Union would be ruled out, come Mar. 1.
A: Butler and Versailles got raises Jan. 1. Yes, back pay for H. L.
Meyer employees is possible, however, we can make no promise
or take any action until after the election.7
The Board found the employer impliedly conditioned the back pay
award on the defeat of the union at the upcoming election as management
stated no decision would be made until the election results were certified.
In agreeing with the Trial Examiner, the Board stated:
5 A § 8 (a) (1) violation of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.)
6 426 F.2d 1090, (8th Cir. 1970), enforcing in part and denying in part 177 N.L.R.B. 565,
74 L.R.R.M. 1186 (1969).
7H.L. Meyer Co., Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 177 N.L.R.B. 565 at 566, 74 L.R.R.M. 1186 at 1187
(1969).
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That some of these replies constitute separate violations of Section
8 (a) (1) in that they created the impression that but for the pending
union campaign certain employee benefits granted at the Respondent's
other plants would have been initiated at the Kansas City Plant. Thus,
the Respondent sought to shift the onus of the delay to the Union and,
at the same time, it impliedly conditioned these wage and vacation
benefits upon defeat of the union at the election.'
In 1971, the Board found in Reliance Electric Co.9 that management's
use of meetings "to hear suggestions from the employees as to their jobs,
what we might do to help them, and... to voice any complaints so we
might adjust (them) where possible" violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the
N.L.R.A. 1° At a series of meetings the employees were afforded the op-
portunity to ask questions concerning any and all aspects of employment
policies and practices currently being engaged in by management. Several
of management's supervisory personnel testified that the meetings were de-
signed as a "complaint session," and the reason for conducting such meetings
was to correct the obvious breakdown in communications that had occurred.
The Board found that even though the meetings were not publicized as a
forum for "airing their complaints," that was the purpose behind the practice.
Finally, the Board stated:
Where, as here, an employer, who has not previously had a practice
of soliciting employee grievances or complaints, adopts such a course
when unions engage in organizational campaigns seeking to represent
employees, we think there is a compelling inference that he is im-
plicitly promising to correct those inequities he discovers as a result
of his inquiries and likewise urging on his employees that the combined
program of inquiry and correction will make union representation
unnecessary."
In Uarco Inc.," the Board found the inference raised by the employer's
conduct in soliciting grievances at preelection management meetings to be
effectively rebutted. The record revealed ten preelection meetings were con-
ducted by management during the month immediately preceeding the elec-
tion. Present at the meetings were various members of the supervisory staff
of the employer. Attendance at the meetings was purely voluntary. The
meetings were open to discussion and the principal complaint was the lack
of communication between management and employees. Even though it
appeared from testimony that the employees' interpreted the purpose of the
aid.
9191 N.L.R.B. 44, 77 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1971).
10 See also Rotek, 194 N.L.R.B. 452b, 78 L.R.R.M. 1685 (1971) (gripe session); Flight
Safety, Inc. 197 N.L.R.B. 223 (1972) (to find out what the problems were within the
department).
"1 191 N.L.R.B. at 46, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1330 (1971); see also Raytheon Co., 188 N.L.R.B.
311 (1971).
12216 N.L.R.B. 1, 88 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1974).
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meetings to afford the workers' the opportunity to express their feelings
regarding employment conditions, management was careful to avoid any
express "solicitation of complaints and grievances."
The Board found that the employer repeatedly conveyed the fact that
no promises could be made and no promises were being made. In follow-
ing this course of conduct, management clearly avoided the situation where
employees could imply from statements made by the employer that condi-
tions might change if the union was defeated at the polls. 3 Furthermore, a
letter containing the following statements was distributed to employees.
This letter exemplified the course of conduct undertaken by management to
express and negate any specific promises.
I am asking you to believe
1. That I have learned what your legitimate problems are.
2. That I am concerned about your problems.
3. That we can work at these problems by working together.
I will make one promise that I will do my best.'"
The recent decision in Carbonneau Industries" involved both the use
of meetings and suggestion boxes by management and soliciting and remedy-
ing grievances during an election campaign. In this case the employer set
up a series of meetings for the purpose of providing to the employees in-
formation concerning the financial and economic status of the company.
These facts were discussed, but the forum was also opened up to questions
concerning working conditions. 6 Also, the employer replaced an old sug-
gestion box with a new one and posted employee suggestions on the bulletin
board. Many of these suggestions were identical to the ones raised at the
previous series of meetings. Also included on the posted suggested cards
were the words "checking into," "done," "finished," or "forthcoming" ad-
jacent to the list of suggestion.'7
The Board in reaching its decision followed the Reliance Electric8 rule
that "an employer who has had a past policy and practice of soliciting em-
ployee grievances may continue such a policy and practice during an
organizational campaign." Here, Carbonneau had in the past had an "open
door" policy on occasion, but the practice was used only sparingly. The
instituting of a policy of holding a series of meetings designed to solicit griev-
ances during an organizational campaign was found to violate the right of
employees to have a free and fair choice in determining a bargaining repre-
sentative.
13 See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
14216 N.L.R.B. at 2.
15 228 N.L.R.B. 597, 94 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1977).
16 Id. at 597, 598. Grievances were aired concerning retirement plans, bathroom ventilation,
additional relief personnel, holes in the floor, floor fans, the roof, and two supervisors.
17 Id. at 598.
1s 191 N.L.R.B. 44. 77 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1971).
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The Union also objected to the employer's corrective measures under-
taken in following the suggestions that were submitted by the employees
in the new suggestion box.' 9 These corrective measures were found by the
Board also to be an interference with the election process.
From the line of decisions in this area, it seems that the Board will
only set aside an election in two situations. The first situation is when the
employer actively pursues the course of action of soliciting grievances in
an organizational campaign and has not engaged in the practice in the
past.2" By doing so the Board will find that the only purpose is to thwart
the union's campaign for representation. The other situation is when an
inference is raised from the evidence that the employer is making a promise,
and this inference is not rebutted by testimony that clearly negates the
implication of a promise depending on the results of the election.2 '
II. INTERROGATION AND POLLING
Once the representation campaign is under way, the employer often
tries to discover exactly what the sympathies and feelings are towards both
union and management. The most direct method to obtain this goal is by
questioning individual workers. Howard W. Kleeb, then the Associate Execu-
tive Secretary of the Board, aptly stated in 1964 the employer's thoughts as
to the discovery of inside information.
When an employer learns that an organizational campaign is going
on among his employees, human nature being what it is, he's just
bursting with curiosity to know whether any of his employees have
joined, if there have been union meetings, who has attended them,
and what was said? How better can he find out than to ask his
employees?'
The original Board view on this subject set forth in 1949 in the decision
of Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co. 3 In the opinion the Board discussed the
general proposition that all interrogation is a violation per se of the
N.L.R.A. 4 The Board stated,
Interrogation by an employer not only invades the employee's privacy
and thus constitutes interference with his enjoyment of the rights guar-
anteed to him by the Act. Its effect on the question employed, like that
of open surveilance of union activity, is to 'restrain' or to 'coerce' the
19 228 N.L.R.B. at 599, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1504 (1977). The employer corrected grievances
such as soda pop machine availability, lunch room facilities, and the number of ventilation
fans in use.
20 191 N.L.R.B. at 46, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
21216 N.L.R.B. at 1, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1103.
22 See Kleeb, Taft-Hartley Rules During Union Organizing Campaigns, 55 L.R.R.M. 114,
115 (1964).
23 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 24 L.R.R.M. 1575 (1949).
24 $ee FIlIST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoAD at p. 76 (1936).
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employee in the exercise of those rights. The employee who is interro-
gated concerning matters which are his sole concern is reasonably
led to believe this employer not only wants information on the nature
and extent of his union interest and activities but also contemplates
some form of reprisal once the information is obtained.2"
The test set forth in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher5 was held to be too
rigid by the courts and was set aside by the Board in 1954.1' In Blue Flash
Express, 8 the General Manager summoned the employees, individually, to
his office and told them he needed some answers to questions regarding
whether the employees had signed union cards. The purpose of the questions
was allegedly to obtain the requisite information so the General Manager
could respond to a letter he had received from the union. Under recent.
decisions based on Standard-Coosa-Thatcher,9 the Board would have found
the employer's conduct to be violative of the Act. However, due to judicial
disapproval, the Board adopted the test set forth by the Second Circuit in
Syracuse Color Press.
We agree and adopt the test laid down . . . which we construed to
be that the answer to whether particular interrogation interferes with,
restrains and coerces employees must be found in the record as a whole.
And as the court states 'The time, the place, the personnel involved,
the information sought and the employer's conceded preference must
be considered.3"
In Blue Flash Express" the Board held the poll conducted by the Gen-
eral manager to be lawful based on the guidelines set down in Syracuse
Color Press." The adoption by the Board of the Syracuse Color Press test 3
in Blue Flash Express" was thought to have clearly set forth a direction of
the law in this area. This was not to be the case. The Board applied the
Blue Flash Express" standard in cases involving interrogation, but the
Courts of Appeal on several occasions reversed the Board on the question
of what was the proper weight to be given the circumstances surrounding
25 85 N.L.R.B. at 1361, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1576.
261d.
27 Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 34 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1954).
28 d.
29 85 N.L.R.B. at 1358, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1575.
30 Syracuse Color Press, 103 N.L.R.B. 377, 31 L.R.R.M. 1473 (1954), enf. 209 F.2d 596
(2nd Cir. 1954), cert. denied 347 U.S. 966 (1954).
"1 109 N.L.R.B. at 591, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1384.
32 209 F.2d 596 (2nd Cir. 1954).
"3 Id.
'4 109 N.L.R.B. at 591, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1384.
s5 Id.
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the interrogation of employees." The Board revised the Blue Flash Express
test in Struksnes3 7
In Struksnes," the employer requested of the union that the company
be informed of the number of employees who were union members as of a
certain date in order to prepare for the coming negotiations. The company
was so informed by the union. Two days later, the supervisory personnel
of the company polled the employees and asked them to sign a paper
whether they desired the company to bargain with and sign a contract with
the union or not to bargain and sign a contract with the union. The em-
ployees were also told that there would not be any reprisal as the company
did not care one way or the other whether there was a union or not. The
Board held that the poll was lawful because
(a) its sole purpose was to ascertain whether the Union represented a
current majority;
(b) the employees were given assurances reprisal;
(c) the evidence failed to establish that the employees answered un-
truthfully, but, even if they did, their answers did not result from
any threats of reprisal; and
(d) the polling occurred in a background free from hostility toward
the Union."
The Board rationale for this holding was based on the revised Blue Flash
Express" test. The Board's criteria was stated in the following language:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an em-
ployer will be violative of Section 8 (a) ( 1 ) of the Act unless the follow-
ing safeguards are observed:
(1) The purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's
claim of majority,
(2) This purpose is communicated to the employees,
(3) Assurances against reprisals are given,
(4) The employees are polled by secret ballot, and
(5) The employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or other-
wise created a coersive atmosphere."
The revised test requires the balloting to be done in secrecy. Furthermore,
the Board warned the parties involved in an organizational campaign
against using polls if a petition for a Board certification election is pending
36 Id.
87 Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1967). See note
10.
88 Id.
39 Id. at 1064.
40 109 N.L.R.B. at 591, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1384.
"11165 N.L.R.B. at 1063, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
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because it would not "serve any legitimate interest of the employer that
would not better be served by the forthcoming Board election."'"
In 1974 the Board was faced with a case' s involving an unprecedented
opportunity for the employees to participate in the selection of a newly
created foreman position in the upholstery department. Management's de-
cision to poll the employees was made after a representation petition had been
filed but almost two months prior to the election. The Chairman of the
Board testified that even though the employees were polled as to their choice
for the position, no promise was made to them that management would
abide by the results. A key fact in the Board's decision was that after the
election a foreman position opened in the mill department. On this
occasion the employees were not polled as to their choice.
The Board held that the polling of the employees violated Section 8
(a) (1) and that the employer's conduct constituted an interference with
the election process. The Board stated:
Even assuming that the participation of the employees in the selection
of a supervisor was not intended by the Respondent to induce the
employees to withdraw their support of the Union, nevertheless, such
action on the part of the Respondent tended to have the effect of so
inducing employees."
The recent case of Clothing Workers v. N.L.R.B. "5 involved an interest-
ing ploy in the employer's attempt to avoid a conflict with the Struksnes
rule.'8 Here, the employer conducted a poll to discover employee preferences
as to whether temporary employees should be permitted to vote at the up-
coming representation election. The balloting took place in several areas
of the plant and was conducted in a rather unorganized manner. In addition
to the voting, management did undertake a rather intensive campaign in
the days prior to the balloting on the subject of temporary versus permanent
employees.
The Board held that the employer violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the
N.L.R.A. in that the polling was conducted in an atmosphere of hostility
between management and the union. In light of these circumstances, the
Board found that the employer's balloting served as a "plebiscite" between
42 Id. at 1063. See also Leonard Fontana, 169 N.L.R.B. 368, 67 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1968)
where the employer interrogated employees while a petition was pending, the purpose of the
interrogation was not communicated to the employees, and threats of a coercive nature
were made to the employees. The Board found this conduct to be a violation of Section 8
(a) (1).
43 Paoli Chair Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 909, 87 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1974).
4Id. at 915.
45 564 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1977) enforcing in relevant part 222 N.L.R.B. 161, 91 L.R.R.M.
1207 (1976).
46 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1967) see note 37 and 38 and accompanying
text, supra.
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the two factions and the ultimate effect was designed to discover the prefer-
ence of sympathy of the employees toward the union.
The Struksnes test"7 has not been modified or rejected since its adoption
in 1967. The safeguards imposed by this standard are very rigid. Any devi-
ation by an employer constitutes an interference with the election process,
and an election will be set aside. If the management desires to conduct a
poll, they must follow the standards set forth in Struksnes religiously.
III. WAIVER OF INITIATION FEES
The waiver of initiation fees is an inducement that gives the union
considerable leverage in attempting to sway the undecided voter over to the
union's side. Always the issue of net pay is raised by the employer. Very
simply management's argument to the workers is the certification of a
union as the bargaining representative will result in less take home pay
due to initiation fees and monthly dues. To combat this argument the union
offers to waive the initiation fee. On occasion the union will even offer a
reduction of the monthly dues for a period of time.
Originally the Board held that a promise to waive initiation fees con-
stituted an act that was not consistent with the rule that employees should
have a free choice in choosing a bargaining representative. 8 In this case
the union's proposal was clear as to how a waiver of initiation fees would
be accomplished." Since the waiver was contingent on the outcome of the
election, the Board adhering to Gruen ° set aside the election. It is important
to note that the waiver in Lobue only applied to those voters who signed
the card before the election. Workers who signed after the results were certi-
fied would not enjoy the benefits.
In 1967, the issue arose again in DIT-MCO, Inc. 1 Again the issue was
whether an election should be set aside when the union offered to waive
initiation fees if the union was victorious. Here, as in Lobue Bros.," the
union offered the worker the opportunity to sign a card which would waive
their initiation fee. However, the waiver would become effective only if
the union won the election. In overruling the employer's objections of im-
47 Id.
4 Lobue Bros., 109 N.L.R.B. 1182, 34 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954). The Board cited The Gruen
Watch Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 610, 34 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1954) for the proposition that an election
will be set aside when a proposed preelection offer is made "contingent on how the em-
ployees voted in the election or on the results of the election."
49 Id. The following is a facsimile of the card distributed to the workers prior to the election.
This is to certify that ....................................................................................................................
................................................................ em ployed by ......................................................................
at ................................................................................. is entitled to a membership book free of
initiation fee after election and certification of shed.
.................................................... ......................................... ..............................................
50 108 N.L.R.B. 610 (1954).
52 163 N.L.R.B. 1019, 64 L.R.R.M. 1476 (1967).
52 109 N.L.R.B. 1482, 34 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954).
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proper conduct by the union during the pre-election campaign, the Board
stated.
We shall assume, arguendo, that employees who sign cards when offered
a waiver of initiation fees do solely because no cost is thus involved;
that they in fact do not at that point really want the union to be
their bargaining representative. The error in the Lobue premise can be
readily seen upon a review of the consequences of such employees
casting vote for or against union representation. Initially, it is obvious
that employees who have received or been promised free membership
will not be required to pay an initiation fee, whatever the outcome of
the vote. If the union wins the election, there is by postulate no obli-
gation; and if the union loses, there is still no obligation, because com-
pulsion to pay an initiation fee arises under the Act only when a union
becomes the employees' representative and negotiates a valid union-
security agreement. Thus, whatever kindly feeling toward the union
may be generated by the cost-reduction offer, when consideration is
given only to the question of initiation fees it is completely illogical
to characterize as improper inducement or coercion to vote 'Yes' a
waiver of something that can be avoided simply by voting 'No'.
The illogic of Lobue does not become any more logical when other
consequences of a vote for representation are considered. Thus, em-
ployees know that if a majority vote for the union, it will be their
exclusive representative, and, provided a valid union-security provision
is negotiated, they will be obliged to pay dues as a condition of em-
ployment. Thus, viewed solely as a financial matter, a 'No' vote will
help to avoid any subsequent obligations, a 'Yes' may well help to
incur such obligations. In these circumstances an employee who did
not want the union to represent him would hardly be likely to vote for
the union just because there would be no initial cost involved in ob-
taining membership. Since an election resulting in the union's defeat
would entail not only no initial cost, but also insure that no dues would
have to be paid as a condition of employment, the financial inducement,
if a factor at all, would be in the direction of a vote against the union,
rather than for it.
In short, there is no valid basis for concluding that an employee
who votes for the union in a secret-ballot election must be doing so
in any substantial measure because of the previously extended or prom-
ised waiver of initiation fees. We conclude, accordingly, that waivers,
or provisional waivers of union initiation fees, whether contingent upon
the results of an election or not, have no improper effect on the freedom
of choice of the electorate, and do not constitute a basis for setting
aside an election 53.
The Board's analysis of the issue of waiver of initiation fees in DIT-
53 163 N.L.R.B. at 1021, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1477. The effect of the decision was to overrule
Lobue Bros. and any cases relying thereon.
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MC05 " was found to be erroneous by the Supreme Court in 1973.11 In this
case, the union circulated "recognition slips" among the employees. By sign-
ing the slip prior to the election, the worker would become a member of
the union and would not have to pay an initiation fee." The Supreme Court
found that by attaching his signature to a slip was tantamount to showing
outward support for the union, and this support could be and probably is
used by the union as a campaign tool in attempting to persuade the workers
who had not signed the cards at that point. The Court went on to state
that if the union is permitted to continue engaging in this campaign ac-
tivity, the Board, in effect, would be allowing "the union to buy endorse-
ments and paint a false portrait of employee support during this election
campaign. '"" One of the major concerns of the Court was that even though
the worker who signed the "recognition slip" was not obligated to vote "Yes"
at the polls, he might feel obligated to do so in light of his previous actions.
With this distinct possibility in mind, the Court held that this might violate
the statutory policy of fair elections as set forth in N.L.R.B. v. Tower Co."5
Since the Savair decision in 1973, the Board and the courts have
handed down several decisions8" that have interpreted the Savair rule. In 1974,
the Board was faced with a situation"' where the employer alleged that the
union unlawfully promised the workers a waiver of initiation fees in order
to persuade them to vote "Yes" for the union at the upcoming election.
The offer by the union to the workers was made primarily in a one-page
leaflet.8" The union contended that a meeting was held to explain the
contents of the leaflet, and the constitution and by-laws provided for such
a promise of waiver. The Board did not accept the union's contentions as
there was not any proof that all workers attended the meeting nor that a
copy of the constitution and by laws was given to the employees. This
54 163 N.L.R.B. at 1019, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1476.
55 N.L.R.B. v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973), affirming 470 F.2d 305, 82 L.R.R.M.
2085 (6th Cir. 1972), reversing 194 N.L.R.B. 298, 78 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1971).
58 414 U.S. at 273 (1973). The initiation fee was sometimes referred to as a fine. Also,
those workers who did not sign the "recognition slip" would have to pay the initiation fee
if the union was voted in as the bargaining representative.
57 Id. at 277.
58 d. at 277 citing N.L.R.B. v. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946). The Board has the
duty to establish "the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice
of bargaining representatives by employees."
59414 U.S. 270 (1973).
60 Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 724, 86 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1974); Coleman Co., Inc.,
212 N.L.R.B. 927, 87 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1974); Certain-Teen Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,
562 F.2d 500, 96 L.R.R.M. 2504 (7th Cir. 1977), enforcing 225 N.L.R.B. 971, 93 L.R.R.M.
1192 (1976); Aladdin Hotel Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 499, 95 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1977).
61211 N.L.R.B. at 724, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
82 Id. at 724 (1974). The leaflet stated in pertinent part; "There are no initiation fees for
charter members of a new local (and that is what you would be). Monthly dues will start
when a contract has been made with the Company." In addition three organizers put their
signatures to the leaflet, and these workers communicated to other workers during the
weeks prior to the election that "charter members" would not have to pay initiation fees.
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being the case, the Board held that the leaflet was subject to various in-
terpretations and therefore the conduct engaged in by the union was pro-
hibited by the Savair decision."
The Board also decided Coleman Co., Inc." in 1974. Here, the union
through a letter to all employees informed the workers that no dues would
have to be paid until a contract was signed with management. However,
with respect to initiation fees the letter stated,6 5 "You will not - pay any
initiation fee. The initiation fee will be waived for all present employees who
make application for charter membership in your new local union." The
Board pointed out that this case falls in line with Inland Shoe Manufacturing
Co., Inc."8 Nowhere in the letter is an explanation offered as to when "ap-
plication must be made" or what is entailed in a "charter membership."
The Board found that this resulted in an ambiguity and could have been
interpreted by the workers that it was to their benefit to join immediately
and "come in at the ground floor." Failure to clarify the possible inter-
pretations that could be derived from the letter violated the rules set forth
in Savair, mainly, an interference with the employee's Section 7 rights.6 '
In 1977, the Seventh Circuit 8 enforced the Board's order that a
pamphlet's language that waived initiation fees was within the guidelines
of Savair6 5 The Court of Appeals held that the employer's contention that
the intent of the language was to inform the workers that the initiation fee
would only be waived if a card was signed prior to the election was without
merit. The Court agreed with the Board and the union that the word
"usually" was used in the context-in describing the customary policy fol-
lowed in the past by the union. Furthermore, the Court held that unlike
workers in Savair0 who were faced with several possible interpretations of
the meaning of the "recognition slips," the workers here were not confused
by the language set forth in the pamphlet.
A year later the Board was faced with a situation where the union
offered the workers a reduced initiation fee and a waiver of the first month's
dues for a majority of prospective union employees."' During the course
of the campaign, the union informed the employees that upon receipt of
63414 U.S. 270 (1973).
04 212 N.L.R.B. at 927, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1004.
65 Id.
66 211 N.L.R.B. at 724, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
67 212 N.L.R.B. at 927 citing 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
68 562 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1977).
69 Id. at 503. The pamphlet's language stated, "In new plants being organized, the Interna-
tional Union usually does not charge an Initiation Fee until after giving employees a certain
period of time to join the Union after a Labor Board election. Those who join during that
period will not be required to pay any initiation fee."
70Id.
7 229 N.L.R.B. at 499, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1150.
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advance payments from a majority of prospective employees, the union
would file a representation petition. If due to lack of support a petition
did not get fied, then any and all funds collected would be returned to
the workers. However, if a petition was filed and the union lost the election,
then the monies collected would be retained by the union to cover the cost
of the campaign. On the other hand, if the union filed a petition and won
the election, then the advance funds would be applied to the first month's
dues after a collective bargaining agreement was signed. A reduced fee
proposal would remain in effect until the contract was signed.
The Board held the forfeiture policy did not constitute improper con-
duct in the election campaign. Rather the Board found the policy
of the union to be one that offered no special inducement that would
hinder the employees' right to a "free and fair choice."'7 Furthermore, the
majority of the Board decided the facts in the instant case did not fall in
line with those of Savair.73 In Savair the union discriminated against the
workers on the basis of whether they favored and supported the union prior
to the election. Here, the situation was found to be the opposite in that
the union treated all the workers alike, and the policy followed by the
union resulted in an unbiased attitude toward both pro-union and anti-
union employees.
In light of these decisions after Savair" the key factor is whether the
union's proposal is discriminatory as applied to all of the workers. As long
as the union's policy is one that treats all of the employees equally, it does
not violate the principles enunciated in Savair. Moreover, by adhering to
Savair, the employees will be guaranteed a free and fair choice at the polls."5
IV. INTERFERENCE WITH THE
BOARD'S ELECTION PROCESS
Generally, the Board's view to the normal everyday campaign propa-
ganda is to maintain a "hands off" policy unless the tactics employed by
either party is such a flagrant interference with the election process. The
use of the reproduction of ballots and other documents fall into the cate-
gory of interference and is viewed with disfavor by the Board.
A. Reproduction of Ballots and Other Board Documents
The rule regarding the use of reproduction of ballots was set forth in
Allied Electric Products, Inc."6 in 1954. This standard is still adhered to
today by the Board in cases involving tactics of this nature. In this case,
the employer, prior to the election circulated among the employees a docu-
72 329 U.S. at 330 (1946).
73 314 U.S. 270 (1973).
74 Id.
7 See note 58, supra.
7 109 N.L.R.B. 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. 1538 (1954). .
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ment that appeared to be a sample copy of the Board's "Official Secret Bal-
lot." ' The Board disagreed with the Regional Director's finding that the
voters were not mislead because the ballot was clearly marked "Sample."
The Board concluded
Although the Board has traditionally declared its intention not to
censor or police preelection campaign propaganda by parties to elec-
tions, it must, in order to preserve an atmosphere of impartiality, impose
certain limitations on methods used in campaigning. The reproduction
of a document to purport to be a copy of the Board's official secret
ballot, but which in fact is alters for campaign purposes, necessarily,
at the very least, must tend to suggest that the material appearing
thereon bears this Agency's approval."'
It is clear from the language of the decision that the Board will not allow
any interference with the administrative functions of the Board. Engaging
in conduct of this nature is an abuse of the election process set up by the
Board, and any tactic employed to thwart the objective of a fair and free
choice for the employees will warrant a setting aside of an election,
Four years later, the question arose whether an election should be
set aside if the ballot is not purported by the employer to be a copy of the
Board's ballot."9 In this case the ballot was on the bottom half of a hand-
bill and the words "SAMPLE OF THE BALLOT" were printed on the
top. The words, "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, OFFICIAL SECRET BALLOT," which are usu-
ally printed on the ballot were missing. However, the "NO" box was
marked with an "X." The Board, adhering to Allied Electric,8" found this to
be a violation and set aside the election.
Another case8' arose in 1958 in which the Board held that the marked
ballot used by the employer did not violate the Allied Products2 rule and
that the ballot did not communicate to the workers the impression of gov-
ernmental endorsement.8" Here, the employer used the word "Sample" in
place of the official words that generally served as the head note and deleted
the official language in the middle of the ballot relating to the purpose of
the ballot. Also, the words directing the voter to sign were deleted. In
place of the signature instructions were the words, "Vote Right - Be Right."
TT Id. at 1271. Actually the employer had made several alterations. (1) The word "Yes" was
printed in very large type and the left of the "Yes" box; (2) There was an "X" in the
"Yes" box; and (3) An additional printed line had been added at the bottom of the ballot,
reading: "Do not mark it any other way - Mark "YES" box only."
78Id. at 1272 citing United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1953).
79 Custom Molders of P.R., 121 N.L.R.B. 1007, 42 L.R.R.M. 1505 (1958).
80 109 N.L.R.B. at 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
81 Glidden Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 752, 42 L.R.R.M. 1428 (1958).
82 109 N.L.R.B. at 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
83 121 N.L.R.B. at 752, 42 LR.R.M. at 1428.
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It is difficult to distinguish Custom Molders" and Glidden" as the re-
productions of the ballot seem to be almost identical. However, a close
examination of the facts of the two cases indicates the Board scrutinized
the effect of the "NO" marked on the Custom Molders ballot and found
the effect to be such that employees might tend to believe this was an
official endorsement.
In analyzing the facts and arriving at a conclusion in cases concerning
reproduction of ballots, the Board still looks to the Allied Electric"' as the
standard to be applied. Thus, in Associated Lerner Shops87 the Board held
the sample ballot used by the employer to be nothing more than a campaign
document. Its use was found not to be such that employees would be led
to believe that the ballot was representative of governmental endorsement.
But when the intent of the reproduction is to create the impression of
governmental endorsement,8 the Allied Electric rule 9 will be applied rigidly
to set aside an election. In Silco,11 the Board held that the ballot used was
not altered enough so as to tend to make one believe this was not an official
endorsement. The deciding factor appears to be whether or not there is
an indication that the altered ballot was prepared by management.
As a result of the decisions that have been rendered by the Board
since the adoption of the Allied Electric rule"' in 1954, management must
sufficiently alter a "Sample" ballot so as not to leave any impression that
the document purports to be a government endorsement. One way to ac-
complish this goal is to draw caricatures on the ballot as management did
in Associated Lerner Shops.92
B. Use of Other Documents
The Board also looks with disfavor at documents other than repro-
ductions of sample ballots. In Mallory Capacitor Co."3 the union circulated
a document that contained an altered reproduction of a complaint issued
by the Regional Director. The altered reproduction was put together in such
a manner that the employees only knew about the alleged violations. Also
the complaint appeared to be a final judgment, when, in fact, it was not.
84 121 N.L.R.B. at 1007, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1505.
.8 121 N.L.R.B. at 752, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1428.
86 109 N.L.R.B. at 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
8 207 N.L.R.B. 348, 84 L.R.R.M. 1463 (1973). The ballot was handwritten. Across the
official headnote language were the words "SAMPLE." Below the "NO" box a hand with
the index finger pointing to the "NO" box was drawn with the words "Your X in this square
will mean you do not want this union."
88 Silco Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 110, 95 L.R.R.M. 1516 (1977).
89 109 N.L.R.B. at 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
80231 N.L.R.B. at 110, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1516.
91 109 N.L.R.B. at 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
92 207 N.L.R.B. at 348, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1463.
93 161 N.L.R.B. 1510, 63 L.R.R.M. 1473 (1966).
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Furthermore, the union added a picture of Uncle Sam pointing a finger
with the words "Uncle Sam says Mallory Bosses Guilty." Citing Allied
Electric," the Board stated, "It particularly looks with disfavor upon any
attempt to misuse its processes to secure partisan advantage."
' The election
was set aside as the purpose of the document was to create an impression
the employer had been found guilty of federal law. For that reason the
election was set aside.
In 1974, the Board decided the Dubie-Clark Co. case.95 Here, the
employer and the union arrived at an informal settlement regarding unfair
labor charges brought by the union. This agreement was dated six weeks
prior to the election. The "Notice to Employees" concerning the informal
settlement was posted 15 days before the election. Three days before
the election the union distributed a leaflet which stated in relevant part:
I am sure you have seen the OFFICIAL NOTICE POSTED under
the requirement of the Law where the National Labor Relations Board,
An Agency of the United States Government, has found that Dubie-
Clark has violated your rights under the Law. There are five (5) WE
WILL END STATEMENTS . . . Read them carefully because they
are very serious violations of your rights in a free and secret bal-
lot election without fear or intimidation.
Yes . . .EMPLOYEE DAY at your plant was postponed by these
violations . . . 'DO YOU THINK THE CHARGES THE UNION
FILED WERE ERRONEOUS AND WITHOUT MERIT'... We
feel that you know the merit of the violation."6
This statement, even though not a reproduction of an official document,
did concern a related official document. The Board set aside the election
based on the fact the above quoted passage was inaccurate and misleading.
Furthermore, the leaflet was used to secure a partisan advantage by creating
an impression that the employer had been adjudged guilty of unfair labor
practices. 7
In this case, Dubie-Clark9 ' was followed in Applegate Lane, Inc.9 the
Board agent sent a letter to an allegedly discharged employee regarding
the present status of this case. One week before the election the employer
sent a leaflet to all of the employees. This leaflet contained a letter from
the employer to Wilcox, the allegedly discharged employee. The pertinent
portion of that letter reads as follows:
94 109 N.L.R.B. at 1270, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1540.
94a 161 N.L.R.B. at 1511, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1474.
95 209 N.L.R.B. 217, 85 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1974).
96d. at 217.
97 Natter Manufacturing Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 118, 86 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1974).
" 209 N.L.R.B. at 217.
99 230 N.L.1-B. 73, 95 L.R.R.M. 1255 (1977).
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Willie Mae Wilcox was never fired. She claims she had hurt her foot
at home and was going to the doctor. She was told to bring a doctor's
certificate when she was ready to return to work. The union unjustly
brought charges against me. The investigator of these charges sent
Willie a letter (copy posted in dining room).x00 (Emphasis in original).
The Board distinguished Dubie-Clark"I from the instant case in that
the union's distribution regarding an informal settlement agreement was for
partisan purposes. Here, the Board found the record revealed the leaflet
contained an official reproduction of a Board document. Furthermore, the
employer did not characterize the letter as being an official government
action. The intent of the leaflet was only to express the opinion of manage-
ment. Thus, in this case, the Board did find the conduct of the employer
constituted an interference with election process.
C. Conduct at the Site of the Election
Another area that the Board scrutinizes very closely is actual conduct
of either of the parties at the election polls as some conduct may be an
interference with the Board's election process.
The Board, in 1968, recognized that past decisions"oz regarding this
conduct had not set forth a clear and concise standard to be applied to future
cases. Thus, the Board enunciated in Michem, Inc."' a strict rule to be
applied to conduct at the polls. In this case, the Secretary-Treasurer of the
union stood around the polls conversing with employees who were waiting
to vote. The union contended that the only remarks made by their repre-
sentative concerned general topics such as the weather. The Board held
that the content of the conversation was immaterial. All that was necessary
to constitute an interference was the fact that the union official was standing
there in the first place. The Board set forth the following rationale for the
adoption of the "blanket prohibition" of such conduct.
Careful consideration of the problem has now convinced us that the
potential for distraction, last minute electioneering or pressure, an unfair
advantage from prolonged conversations between representatives of
any party to the election and voters waiting to cast ballots is of suffi-
cient concern to warrant a strict rule against such conduct, without
inquiring into the nature of the conversations. The final minutes before
an employee casts his vote should be his own, as free from interference
as possible, Furthermore, the standard here applied insures that no
party gains a last minute advantage over the other, and at the same
time deprives neither party of any important access to the ear of the
voter.'
'oo ld. at 74.
11209 N.L.R.B. at 217, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1322.
102 Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 67 L.R.R.M. 1395 (1968).
103 Id.
104 ld. at 362.
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This rule also applies to parties that do not engage in conversation in
the polling area."0 5 In this case, several representatives of the union were
positioned near the polling area with the list of the eligible employees who
could vote. As each employee entered and departed the area, the union
representatives made notations on the list. The Board held that the notations
made could be inferred to be a recording of their names for future reference.
Relying on several past decisions,"' the Board stated, "It has . . . been the
policy of the Board to prohibit anyone from keeping any list of persons
who had voted, aside from the official eligibility list used to check off
the voters as they received their ballots."1 '
The Michem rule' is clear to the rationale behind it and the manner
in which it will be applied. No one is allowed to be in the voting area. If
either side violates this rule, the election will be set aside.
V. MISREPRESENTATIONS
The issue of misrepresentation by either of the parties in a campaign
election is of particular interest today. For many years the Board kept a
watchful eye on every move made by a party during a campaign.' °9 Then
in April of 1977, the Board reversed its philosophy and rejected Hollywood
Ceramics.' In December, 1977,111 the Board suddenly reverted back to
Hollywood Ceramics. At this point the immediate future of misrepresentation
issues is clear, but as to the long term viability of the Hollywood Ceramics
test, the future is uncertain as the Board may choose once again to adopt
a different standard to deal with misrepresentation issues.
The National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.)112 specifically provides
in Section 7 that the employees shall have the right to choose or not to
choose a collective bargaining representative. If a bargaining representative
is chosen by the employees, that bargaining representative is the exclusive
representative of the workers for the purpose of negotiating with manage-
ment the terms of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment."'
As stated in the introduction, the most common method of choosing
115 Piggly-Wiggly, 168 N.L.R.B. 792, 66 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1967).
100 International Stamping, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 921, 29 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1951); Belk's De-
partment Store of Savannah, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 280, 29 L.R.R.M. 1325 (1952); A. D.
Julliard and Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2197, 35 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1954).
107 168 N.L.R.B. at 793, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1360.
108 170 N.L.R.B. at 362, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1395.
109 Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962). The Hollywood
Ceramics standard is used by the Board to investigate all aspects of alleged misrepresentations
including whether the statement is true or false.
110 Shopping Kart Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
11M General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (December
6, 1978).
11229 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
11 Id. § 159 (a).
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an exclusive bargaining representative is by a N.L.R.B. - conducted repre-
sentation election.11 The only requirement spelled out in the N.L.R.A. is that
the election must be carried out by secret ballot."' Other than this requirement,
the Board has a great deal of discretion in setting forth the rules and pro-
cedures to be used in a representation election.
In adopting these rules and procedures for the conduct of elections, the
primary concern has been the guarantee to the employees of a free choice
at the polls. The Board, as an independent guarantor of the exercise of free
will, in effect, becomes a guardian over the preelection activities of both
the union and the employer. The purpose behind this policy has been to
protect both parties as the outcome of an election affects employer and
employee in terms of wages, hours, and working conditions. Thus, the
Board began in 1948 to follow a policy of guaranteeing "laboratory con-
ditions" 16 situation during the campaign.
A. Background of Hollywood Ceramics
The policy of "laboratory conditions" was set forth in General Shoe
Corp."' In this case the employer engaged in certain activities during the
last two months of the campaign which were alleged by the union to be
coercive in nature. First, the employer sent a series of letters to the em-
ployees to correct certain prior misleading statements dealing with the
loss of jobs and pay increases if the workers should become unionized.
Subsequently, the President of the company sent personal messages to the
employees concerning paternalistic benefits now enjoyed by all employees
without a union. Finally, during the final week of the campaign, manage-
ment paid for a full page advertisement in the town's newspaper, addressed
small groups of workers in the President's office, and distributed a series
of leaflets to the employees. The leaflets were clearly indicative of man-
agement's position in that they included slogans such as "Let's Have the
Truth," and disparaging cartoons of the American Federation of Labor.
In addition, the leaflets contained questions such as "Why there had been
no unionization drive at other plants?" and "Why the United States Gov-
ernment did not allow unionization at Oak Ridge during the production
stages of the atomic bomb?". As to the latter question, management offered
several possible answers. One such answer was that it was just possible
that the government did not trust union leaders. Another was that unioniza-
tion means trouble. Also religious overtones were added to the campaign
in form of accusations aimed at the union's representative.
The result of the company's intensive campaigning was a one sided
A14Id. §§ 152, 159 (c) (1).
A5 Id. § 159 (c).
16 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
'IT Id.
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victory. The union brought unfair labor charges against the company
for the type of tactics employed. The Board held there was no violation
of Section 8 (1) as management's viewpoints were expressed in the form
of opinions, not threats or reprisals. However, the Board did set the election
aside on the basis that management's conduct created an atmosphere which
rendered a free choice improbable, and therefore, the results should be
invalidated even though the conduct did not constitute an unfair labor
practice. The Board found that "an election can serve its true purpose
only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and
untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative. 18
The policy adopted by the Board was analogized to that of a scientific
experiment.' The idea behind this policy was to put the worker in a
vacuum so as not to affect his choice at the polls. But, however ideally
the Board may desire a "laboratory" type situation, that is not practicable
as the effect would be no campaigning at all. No campaigning would then
be a restriction of free choice as the employee would not have the facts
of the management's viewpoint. This being the case, the Board has followed
a policy of allowing certain campaign practices so as to permit a choice
between the parties, but the Board consistently maintained on paper
that the "laboratory conditions" concept must prevail. °
After the General Shoe1"' opinion was set forth, three major decisions
1 22
were handed down by the Board during the next thirteen years. The rationale
of these opinions culminated in the Hollywood Ceramics22 test which was
followed for the next fifteen years.
In United Aircraft Corp., " the Board set aside an election due to
118 Id. at 126.
119 Id. at 127. The Board stated "in election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide
a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly as
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to
establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been ful-
filled. When, in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our fault
or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment
must be conducted over again."
120 For a criticism of the "laboratory condition" ideal see Siegel, Union Election Campaigns
-A New Ball Game Under the Board's Shopping Kart Ruling? 1978 LABOR LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 35 (1977) hereinafter cited as Union Election Campaigns. Siegel quotes Judge Gold-
berg's language in N.L.R.B. v. Sumpter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1976). Judge
Goldberg's opinion as to "laboratory conditions" was "Although the Board aspires to labo-
ratory conditions in elections, we recognize that clinical asepsis is an unattainable goal in
the real world of union organizational efforts. Some degree of puffery and propagandizing
must be permitted else the laboratory would be found infected in every case. But in the
end, we must rest our faith in the ability of the workers, apprised of the position of both
sides on all issues, to see through puffery and hyberbole and to vote their own interests."
12177 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
122 United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1953); Gummed Products
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1955); U.S. Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 901,
47 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1961).
123 140 N.L.R.B. at 221, 41 L.R.R.M. at 1600.
124 103 N.L.R.B. at 102, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1437.
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management's distribution to the employees of a forged telegram that al-
legedly contained false information. The Board reasoned that it was virtu-
ally impossible for the employee voters to realize the nature of the telegram,
and therefore its distribution interferred with their freedom of choice.
Two years later, Gummed Products Co. 2' was decided. Here, the Union
distributed handbills one week before the election which contained the wage
rates allegedly paid by other companies represented by the union. One of
the companies referred to in the handbill was Setton Fiber Company which
was located about eight miles from Gummed Products. Setton was engaged
in the same type of manufacturing as Gummed Products. Management
of Gummed Products checked the rates in the handbill with Setton and
found them to be erroneous. Immediately management challenged the
union to reply. The union chose not to do so. The Board in setting aside the
results of the election stated, "The ultimate consideration is whether the
challenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning to the
point where it may be said that the uninhibited desires of the employees
cannot be determined in an election."' 28 In the instant case, the Board found
the union representative who incorrectly stated the wages of the Setton
plant was in a position to know the wage rates as he was also the bargaining
representative for the workers at Setton. This being the case, the employees
at Gummed Products were intentionally mislead, and their freedom of
choice was interferred with.
In U.S. Gypsum Co.,'27 the employer received telegrams from the
manager of another U.S. Gypsum plant. The telegrams stated that the
"International Boss" of the union had all the control over negotiations, and
the members at his plant now regret ever being associated with the union.
These telegrams were posted in the plant and copies were distributed to
supervisors who then discussed the text of the telegram with the employees.
The Board held that the manager of the other plant was in a position to
know the circumstances surrounding negotiations at his plant, and he
knew that local members were permitted and had participated in the negoti-
ation process in the past. Based on these facts, the Board determined that
the election should be set aside and in the future other elections should
also be set aside
where (1) the employees would tend to give particular weight to the
misrepresentation because it came from a party that .. . was in an
authoritative position to know the true facts, and (2) no other party
had sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresentation before the
election."2 8
125 112 N.L.R.B. at 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1156.
12 Id. at 1094, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
227 130 N.L.R.B. at 901, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1436.
129id. at 902 (citing Celanese Corp. of America, 121 N.L.R.B. 303, 42 L.R.R.M. 1354
(1958)).
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B. Hollywood Ceramics
In 1962, the Board set forth the test 129 that was used without interrup-
tion in election cases involving misrepresentation allegations for the next
fifteen years. In Hollywood Ceramics the union distributed a handbill to
the employees in English and Spanish. This handbill contained comparative
wage rates for similar job classifications at other ceramic plants that were
represented by the union. However, the wage rates stated in the handbill
did not reveal the effect of the existing payment plan, and the only reference
made to this incentive plan was at the end of the wage rate tables. This
reference was printed only in English. Also, the rates stated by the union
were not truly comparative as the type of operations and degree of skill
required at the other plants varied from the Hollywood plant.
The Board's holding in Hollywood Ceramics was based on the policy
that the employees must be guaranteed a full and complete freedom of
choice in the selection of a bargaining representative. However, this policy
must be balanced with the rights of the participants in an election to conduct
a vigorous campaign. The Board noted this balance that must exist has
been stated several ways. 3 For the guidance of the parties involved in the
instant case, the Board restated the formula in the following manner.
We believe that an election should be set aside only where there has
been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which in-
volves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents
the other party or parties from making an effective reply, so that this
misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be ex-
pected to have a significant impact on the election. However, the mere
fact that a message is inartistically or vaguely worded and subject to
different interpretations will not suffice to establish such misrepresen-
tation as would lead us to set the election aside. Such ambiguities, like
extravagant promises, derogatory statements about the other party,
and minor distortions of some facts, frequently occur in communication
between persons. But even where a misrepresentation is shown to
have been substantial, the Board may still refuse to set aside the election
if it finds upon consideration of all the circumstances that the statement
would not be likely to have had a real impact on the election.''
In applying this standard to the facts, the Board found the handbill
to have violated the employees' freedom of choice in that the misrepresenta-
tions stated therein grossly understated the employer's rates, and the rates
for the compared plant were very much exaggerated. Furthermore, the
passing reference to the Hollywood incentive plan was ambiguous and, in
effect, gave the employee several possible interpretations as to the meaning
of the statement. Also, the Board noted that even if the sentence is the
129 140 N.L.R.B. at 221, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1600.
230 See note 7, 140 N.L.R.B. at 221, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1600.
is, Id. at 224.
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handbill referring to the incentive plan was acceptable, the fact that the
sentence was printed only in English was misleading to the approximate
one-third Spanish speaking.
The basic factors of the Hollywood Ceramic test' are (1) the mis-
representation must be substantial, (2) the misrepresentation must be reason-
ably tend to have a significant impact on the election, and (3) the mis-
representation must be made at such a time that an insufficient opportunity
exists for the opposition to reply. In addition, the Board noted in footnote
10 of the opinion that the statement may be more likely to be deceiving
if made by a person in a position of authority that has access to the truth
or falsity of the statement.'
The adoption of the standard left the Board a great deal of discretion
in applying the test to each case. The Board was able to look at each
particular set of facts... and determine whether the misrepresentation was
substantial and whether it could have a significant impact on the election.
In analyzing the facts on the basis of these two criteria, the Board's decisions
did not follow a consistent pattern 3 ' due to the nature of the test and the
philosophies of the different individuals serving on the Board over the years.
With regard to the time of the misrepresentation, the Board and the
courts often were able to dispose of this factor rather easily."' The key
is whether the employees have a sufficient opportunity to gain access to
the information which is the source of the misrepresentation.' 7 If the em-
1821d.
13 The "knowledge" factor is not always required. See 9 TOL. L. REv. 399 at 405 (1977).
The First Circuit stated the formula for "special knowledge" in terms of the employee's
perception. In N.L.R.B. v. A.G. Pillard Co., 39 F.2d 239 at 242 (1st Cir. 1968), the court
stated, "In judging the effect of a misrepresentation the test cannot be whether the speaker
had special knowledge, but must be whether the listeners would believe that he had a
misrepresentation by one having prime access to pertinent facts would be of no consequence
if, for some reason, his listeners did not think him believable. On the other hand, a
misrepresentation by one in fact having no knowledge at all would be effective if he thought
to be credible."
"4 See 38 TEMPLE L. QTRLY 288 (1965) with specific reference to footnote 2 at p. 288
and accompanying text.
235 See Union Election Campaigns at 41; 56 N.C. L. RS1. 389, 394 (1978).
'
36 See Lipman Motors, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 451 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1971). In this case the
misrepresentation took place one week before the election. The Board held one week to
be sufficient for the opposition to reply and the Second Circuit affirmed; Gummed Products
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1955), where two days was not sufficient time
to reply. And Lundy Packing Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 905, 44 L.R.R.M. 1530 (1959), where
two days was sufficient time in that these misstatements had been made two months before,
and this was ample time for the employees to investigate their accuracy. See N.L.R.B. v.
Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1972) for criticism of Board's policy regard-
ing the time element.
237For example, see N.L.R.B. v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1967). In this
case the union disturbed a leaflet two days before the election comparing the "Beta" and
the "Union contract" ways for measuring piece work. The company contended this was
a misrepresentation. However, the company did not respond to the union's allegations in
the company-published anti-union leaflet published two days after the distribution of the
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ployees are able in a timely manner to discover the truthfulness or falsity of
the information, then the Board is not likely to set aside an election.
The Board is also found after the adoption of the Hollywood Ceramics
standard that the courts often disagreed with the Board's decision.' Prob-
lems with court enforcement and the general attitude of the labor com-
munity regarding inconsistencies in decisions led the Board to reexamine the
Hollywood Ceramics test in Modine Manufacturing Co.39
C. Modine Manufacturing Co.
In Modine," ° the union won the election by a vote of 93 to 86 over
the Intervenor Sheet Metal Workers' International Association Local Union
No. 2, AFL-CIO. The Intervenor challenged the result with allegations
that the Union had made material misstatements as to wages, benefits, strike
assistance, and dues. The Respondent company desired a hearing after
the Intervenor filed objections to the election. In its brief the Intervenor
stated that in several recent cases the Board had erred in failing to direct
hearings when alleged misrepresentations were based on the Hollywood
Ceramics standard.
The Board stated in the test of the decision that the task of the Board
is very difficult in terms of funds and personnel to deal with the numerous
cases that arise each year.' The Board went on to say that the task as-
signed to the Board is an administrative one, and a decision must always
be made one way or another when an objection is filed over an election.
Clearly, if the integrity of the election is shown by one of the parties to
be in doubt, then the Board must examine the background of the election
notwithstanding the factors of funds and personnel that may have to be
expended to settle the question. However, in cases where the allegations are
too speculative, the Board must in administrative capacity refuse to hear
the case. The purpose of refusing to hear a case is based on the need to
effect the election result when the allegations are too speculative to warrant
review. In order to inform participants in future elections, the Board, ad-
hering to Hollywood Ceramics, stated the following policy.
leaflet. Also, the Regional Director found that "because most of the employer's production
employees are piece workers, the employees themselves would be in an excellent position
to evaluate the truth or falsity of "Bata's Way." The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Director's conclusions.
13sSee Williams, Janus, and Huhn, NLRB Regulation of Election Conduct, p. 17-19.
(Univ. of Pa. Wharton School Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974) (here-
inafter cited as NLRB Regulation of Election Conduct). Bok, The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L.
REV. 38, 82-90 (1964); 56 N.C. L. REv. 389 (1978) notes 34, 38 and accompanying text
(hereinafter cited as Regulation of Campaign Tactics).
139 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 83 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 529. The Board noted that 27,000 unfair labor charges and 9,000 elections must
be processed and handled each year.
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• . . there must be a reasonably flexible and not too constrained or
rigidly controlled area left for administrative expertise in determining,
in the best judgment we can muster from our knowledge and experience
in the field, and in the exercise of sound administrative discretion, what
circumstances justify either invalidating an election or holding a hearing
on misrepresentation issues.1"'
As to the Hollywood Ceramics standard, the Board explicitly reaffirmed
the test and indicated how the Board would evaluate cases in the future.
It thus becomes our recurring task to make a determination, with the
aid of such expertise in the field as we may collectively have developed,
as to whether the nature of such last-minute departures is such as
to constitute a "substantial" departure from the truth, as to whether
the issue involved is itself "substantial," as to whether it is likely to
have "had a real impact on the election," as well as the collateral,
but not unrelated issues of whether there was time for an effective
reply, whether employees might reasonably have relied on the mis-
representation, and so on. " '
From the language of the Modine opinion, the Board seemed to believe
that from that point on the Hollywood Ceramics standard would be better
understood as to how the test would be applied and the policy underlying
the application. However, as much as the Board had hoped for a better
understanding of its policy in the labor community, this was not to be
the case.
D. Member Penello's Dissenting Opinions
A year after Modine was decided, the Board heard the case of Medical
Ancillary Services, Inc.'" The case involved alleged misstatements by the
chief stewardess to an employee concerning information made to the stew-
ardess by the Vice President of the company. The Board affirmed the ad-
ministrative law judge's decision that these statements were too close to
the time of the election and a strong likelihood existed that they had a sub-
stantial impact on the election.
Member Penello, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, began a crusade
against the majority's strict interpretation of the Hollywood Ceramics' "labo-
ratory conditions" concept. The dissent's criticism was twofold in that (1)
the decision was a miscarriage of justice, and more importantly (2), the
Board's entire policy concerning misrepresentation issues in elections was
erroneous and should be laid to rest." ' The language used by Member
1421d. at 530.
14 31d. at 529.
1+ 212 N.L.R.B. 582, 86 L.R.R.M., 1598, supplementing 195 N.L.R.B. 290, 74 L.R.R.M.,
1328, (1974).
145 d. at 586. Specially, Member Penello argued vigorously that the Board has continued to
review whether the misstatements are true or false when in the past the Board has said they
would not engage in such a determination. Also, the Board suggested in Modine that in
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Penello is extremely strong and very much to the point. The following
statements clearly indicate his strong desire to rid the labor community
of the "laboratory conditions" doctrine imposed by Hollywood Ceramics
and adopt the more modern point of view of intervening only when the
deception is intentional.
I submit that under the guise of maintaining laboratory conditions we
are treating employees not like mature individuals capable of facing
the realities of industrial life and making their own choices but as
retarded children who need to be protected at all costs. . . In sum,
the Gummed Products role, as "clarified" by Hollywood Ceramics, has
served only to impose increasingly greater restrictions on activities of
parties in conjunction with Board elections and heavier caseloads on
the Board and has led to substantial delays in the final disposition of
representation cases. I see no reason why the Board should continue
to intervene "to protect voters from their own gullibility," and would
limit Board intervention to cases involving . . . intentional trickery
which the voters could have no reason to suspect and no reason to
check for authenticity. "'
In 1975, Member Penello again filed a strong dissent against the con-
tinued use of the Hollywood Ceramics rule in Ereno Lewis. "" Here, a leaflet
was distributed by management with a "sample check" attached revealing
the net amount an employee could expect to receive if the union won the
election. A majority of the Board found that the company had misstated
the initiation fee and the period in which all monies due the union had to
be paid. Therefore, on the basis of these facts, the majority found that the
employer had engaged in a material misrepresentation and due to the
timing of distribution of the leaflet, the union was left without an adequate
amount of time to reply.
Member Penello, as he did in Medical Ancillary Services, Inc.1 8 traced
the development of misrepresentation cases and strongly attacked the majori-
ty's continued adherence to Hollywood Ceramics. In this case, Member
Penello did agree with his fellow colleague, Member Jenkins, as to the
computation of the monies as the amount required to be contributed was
actually understated by several dollars." 9 As to the time period required
for payment, Member Penello argued that at no time did the company state
the future there would be a tightening of the number of hearings granted by the Board,
and that has not been the case as evidenced by the present decision. Finally, he cites
Professor Bok's treatise on campaign regulation, Regulation of Campaign Tactics and the
Williams study, NLRB Regulation of Election Conduct regarding the vagueness and sub-
jectivity of the Hollywood Ceramics test.
146 Id. at 585, 586.
147 Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239, 88 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1975).
148 212 N.L.R.B. at 582, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1598.
149 217 N.L.R.B. at 240. Due to the numerous funds that members would be required to
contribute to, the amount used by the employer on the "sample check" was fairly accurate.
The Union could only contend that the amounts stated were placed in the wrong fund.
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or imply that the total amount had to be paid at once. All the company was
trying to accomplish was to show the employees what the financial impact
of union deductions would mean to their take-home pay. In conclusion,
Member Penello contended that all employees had to do to comprehend
the meaning of the figures used on the "sample check" was to use some
basic everyday common sense and their ability to understand the English
language. Perhaps Member Penello's view with regard to the majority
opinion is best summarized in the opening paragraph of his dissenting
opinion.
In the hope that my words will not fall on deaf ears, I take this oppor-
tunity to urge once more that this Board give Hollywood Ceramics a
decent burial and return to its earlier, intrinsically sound policy of
not inquiring into the truth or falsity of the parties' campaign state-
ments. "'
E. Shopping Kart Market, Inc.
With great pleasure, Member Penello along with Member Walther drafted
the majority opinion in Shopping Kart Market, Inc.' in April, 1977. This
decision in this case resulted in the "decent burial" of Hollywood Ceramics.
For many in the labor community, the decision did not come as any great
surprise."'
In Shopping Kart, the union's Vice President and business representative
stated on the day before the election that the company's profits for the
previous year was $500,000 when in fact it was only $50,000. The Regional
Director found there was no misrepresentation under Hollywood Ceramics
since the union representative was not in a position to have access to the
profits of the company. The Board agreed with the Regional Director,
but the majority based its decision on Member Penello's dissenting opinions
in Medical Ancillary' and Ereno Lewis. 5' The majority accepted Member
Penello's contentions that the Hollywood Ceramics standard was unworkable
and burdensome. Continued reliance on Hollywood Ceramics would result
in extensive analysis of campaign propaganda, restriction of free speech,
variance in application as between the Board and the courts, increase in
litigation, and a resulting decrease in the finality of election results.
In following Member Penello's dissenting opinions in Medical Ancil-
150ld.
151228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977). In footnote 24 the majority notes for all
practical purposes Member Murphy (concurring opinion) is in complete agreement with
the majority.
'
52 See Phalen, Jr., The Demise of Hollywood Ceramics: Fact and Fantasy, 46 U. CiN. L.
REv. 450 (1977) with specific reference to the biographical information note on the author.
The note points out two months prior to the Shopping Kart decision the American Bar
Association's Labor Law Section was forewarned of the death of Hollywood Ceramics
by Mr. Phalen and Member Penello.
153 212 N.L.R.B. at 582, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1598.
154 217 N.L.R.B. at 239, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1481.
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lary55 and Ereno Lewis," the majority relied to a great extent on several
research studies"' on labor election processes and employee voter behavior
as a basis for their decision. First, the majority accepted the conclusion of
Professor Bok'5 8 to substantiate the ill effect of increased litigation under
Hollywood Ceramics. The next source relied upon by the majority was the
study done by Messrs. Williams, Janus, and Huhn.'5 9 This research deals
with an analysis of the elements required by the Hollywood Ceramics test
and the inconsistencies that result therefrom. Specifically cited by the majori-
ty are problems associated with applying the substantiality and materiality
of an alleged misrepresentation to a particular set of facts. Also discussed
are the factors of the source of the misrepresentation and the independent
knowledge of the persons involved. The majority concludes their discussion
of NLRB Regulation of Campaign Elections by citing the caveat set forth
by authors.
As long as the Board continues to probe into the truth or falsify of
campaign statements and measure their effect on election results by
these uncertain standards, parties unsuccessful in the balloting will
be object routinely to their opponents' campaign statements and the
Board will be forced to engage in a painstaking analysis of everything
that was said in the campaign with the certification of the election
results delayed in the interim."
It appears from the opinion the strongest weight given to outside
research is accorded to the two-part study' by Professors Getman, Gold-
berg and Herman. Part I of the project deals with the Board's assumptions'62
concerning employee behavior in a certification election while Behavioral
'55 212 N.L.R.B. at 582, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1598.
156 217 N.L.R.B. at 239, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1481.
15 Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A Proposal, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1441 (1977); Julius G. Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg, Jeanne B. Herman,
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board
Regulates, 27 STAN. L. Rnv. 1465 (1975) hereinafter cited as Behavioral Assumptions, Part
I; and Julius G. Getman and Stephen Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 263 (1975) hereinafter cited as Behavioral Assumptions, Part 11.
15 8 See N.L.R.B. Regulation of Election Conduct. Professor Bok contends that restrictions
on the content of campaign propaganda requiring truthful and accurate statements "resist
every effort at clear formulation and tend inexorably to give rise to vague and inconsistent
rulings which baffle the parties and provoke litigation."
159 See N.L.R.B. Regulation of Elections Conduct.
160 228 N.L.R.B. at 1312; citing NLRB Regulation of Election Conduct.
161 See Behavioral Assumptions, Part I and Part II.
162 Behavioral Assumptions, Part I. The assumptions found in their research were divided
into the following categories: (1) the assumption that employees are attentive to the cam-
paign, (2) the assumption that employees will interpret ambiguous statements by the em-
ployer as threats or promises, (3) the assumption that employees are unsophisticated about
labor relations, (4) the assumption that free choice is fragile, (5) the assumption that limited
union campaigning on company premises is adequate, and (6) the assumption about authori-
zation card signing as an indication of free choice.
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Assumptions, Part H, is devoted to the methods163 used by the researchers
in the selection of specific elections and the approach used to evaluate the
results of these elections. Based on these assumptions' found by Pro-
fessors Getman and Goldberg, the majority appears to have accepted their
conclusions and without reservation and stated
Based on the assumptions of employee behavior which we find dubious
at best and productive of a host of ill effects, we believe that on balance
the Hollywood Ceramics rule operates more to frustrate free choice
than to further it and that the purposes of the Act would be better
served by its demise.'65
The majority concluded the decision by adhering to the principle that the
Board would intervene in the future only where a party had engaged in
deceptive practices during the campaign.
A concurring opinion was filed by Chairman Murphy. The only de-
parture from the majority opinion by Chairman Murphy was that an election
should also be set aside cases in which a party makes an "egregious mistake
of fact.""' The concurrence then cited two cases as examples in which
the election should not be set aside. 6 Other than these two examples,
Chairman Murphy did not explain what would constitute an "egregious
mistake of fact."
A partial dissent was filed by Members Fenning and Jenkins. Their
chief concern was what the future held with regard to the death of Hollywood
Ceramics. In no way were these two members convinced of the proposition
by the majority that today's employee voter had such sophistication to
decipher the statements made during a heated campaign without the guiding
protection of the Board. Also, the dissent attached to the Getman and Gold-
berg study as in conclusive and criticized the majority for not coming
forward in their opinion with all the results allegedly discovered by the
project.'68 Finally, these two members suggest that the "almost anything
163 Behavioral Assumptions, Part If. Factors used by the authors in selecting the thirty-one
representative elections were the intensity of the campaign elections that involved unlawful
campaigning, type of business operations, and the size of the city in which the election
was conducted.
164 Id., See note 162, supra.
165 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
166Id. at 1314.
167 Id. The first case cited is Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 210, 90
L.R.R.M. 1477 (1975). Here the misrepresentation involved the understanding of financial
figures allegedly made regarding company profits. The second case cited is Contract
Knitter, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 579. 90 L.R.R.M. 1484 (1975) which involved a misstatement
of the earnings of employees at other plants.
168 Id. at 1315. The criticism was aimed at the small number of elections studied out of
the numerous elections conducted by the N.L.R.B. Members Fanning and Jenkins also
stated that out of ten thousand elections per year only three to four percent are brought
to the Board for review. And out of that small percentage only seven percent of the
elections are set aside (i.e. twenty-five to twenty-seven elections per year). In light of these
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goes" policy of the majority will only result in increased campaign charges
and countercharges, and this is directly in conflict with the supposed in-
tention of the majority to restrict litigation in representation cases.
Member Jenkins also filed a further dissent which was highly critical
of the majority. He contended that the majority's opinion was not based
on any logical reasoning but rather on the basis of a law review article.'
Further challenges were then levelled at Getman and Goldberg's methodology
and logic.'7 ° From the conclusions reached by these researchers and subse-
quently adopted in toto by the majority, Member Jenkins reasoned the
future would only bring uncertainty and unfairness in misrepresentation
cases.
F. Decisions Under Shopping Kart
In Shopping Kart's short lifetime only a few cases were decided and
by the time it was overruled17 no clear line of thought had yet emerged.
Regardless, due to shifts in Board policy" 2 in the past three years, it is not
beyond reason to say that the present policy will not be changed in the
future. Therefore, an analysis of several cases decided under Shopping
Kart may be helpful if in the future the Board decides to readopt the Shop-
ping Kart doctrine.
In Thomas E. Gates & Sons, Inc.,' 3 the employer in a letter to the
employees understated wages payable under the contract by nearly $2.00
per hour. This alleged misrepresentation took place four days prior to the
election. The Regional Director decided the election should be set aside
on the basis of Hollywood Ceramics. The Board concluded this was a mis-
leading campaign statement and under the Shopping Kart doctrine did not
warrant setting aside the election. Member Fanning, dissenting, stated
that a misstatement of wages by approximately $2.00 per hour with an
adequate time to reply was a misrepresentation, and he would set aside
the election as the misrepresentation would have a substantial impact on
the election. Footnotes to the opinion indicate again that elections will only
be set aside in cases of deceptive practices and when the conduct of one
of the parties commits fraud that is an "egregious mistake of fact" (Mem-
ber Murphy).
In National Council of Young Israel, dba, Shalom Nursing Home,17 4 the
statistics which were not revealed in the majority opinion, the partial dissent argues that
the time and funds required to maintain this investment is well worth it.
169 Behavioral Assumptions, Part . and Part 1I.
'
7 0 See also 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 50, 57 (1977).
17 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (December 8, 1978).
172 Shopping Kart's existence as Board policy lasted only 20 months until the Board re-
adopted Hollywood Ceramics.
'73 229 N.L.R.B. 705, 95 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1917).
174 230 N.L.R.B. 980, 95 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1977).
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union, immediately preceding the election, distributed a letter to the em-
ployees concerning its contract negotiating results. This letter contained
information that amounted to a misrepresentation. The majority (Members
Penello and Walther) found that this was a misleading campaign statement
that did not fall within the narrow exceptions to the Shopping Kart rule.
Again Member Fanning dissented. This time Member Fanning dissented
on the basis that the employer did not have sufficient time to reply to
the statements made by the union.
The next misrepresentation case to be decided was Cormier Hosiery
Mills, Inc."5 Here, the Regional Director set aside an election in which the
union misrepresented that the employer used an accounting procedure
to hide $200,000 so that the amount would not be calculated into the
profit-sharing plan. Members Penello and Walther sustained the results
of the election on the basis of Shopping Kart. Member Murphy found no
"egregious mistake of fact," and, therefore the case falls outside of her
concurring opinion in Shopping Kart.
In Precision Fabricators, Inc.,'76 the majority consisting of Members
Penello and Murphy found that even if the alleged misrepresentations in the
preelection campaign were true, the election should not be set aside on the
basis of Shopping Kart. Member Jenkins dissented by stating that the wages
and benefits described in the leaflet which was distributed by the union
did leave an adequate amount of time for the employer to reply. Furthermore,
the effect of these misrepresentations could reasonably be expected to
have a substantial impact on the election.
The Board in Shopping Kart Market, Inc."' did hold that an election
would be set aside "in instances where a party has engaged in such deceptive
campaign practices as improperly involving the Board and its processes, or
the use of forged documents which renders the voters unable to recognize
the propaganda for what it is.""' 8 In Formico, Inc., 9 the Board had the
opportunity to apply the Shopping Kart exception. In this case, the em-
ployer had been charged with unfair labor practices. The charges were
disposed of due to a settlement agreement which contained a non-admission
clause. The union distributed a letter during the campaign claiming the
Board had found the employer guilty of unfair labor charges. The Regional
Director certified the union's victory on the basis of Shopping Kart. This
decision was reversed unanimously by the Board (Members Fanning and
Murphy and Jenkins). The Board held that the tactic used by the union
was deceptive in nature and was an improper use of the Board's election
175 230 N.L.R.B. 1052, 95 L.R.R.M. 1461 (1977).
176 233 N.L.R.B. 1404, 97 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1977).
177 228 N.L.R.B. at 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
178ld. at 1313.
179233 N.L.R.B. 61, 96 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1977).
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process. It was irrelevant how much time had passed between the date
the letter was distributed and the date of the election.
Also to be considered is whether Shopping Kart should have been
applied retroactively. The Appeals Court on several occasions have had the
opportunity to consider the question. Even though Shopping Kart has been
overruled, 8 ' the question is still of great importance.
In Blackmun-Uhler Chemical Division v. N.L.R.B.'8 ' the appeals
court remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration' 82 to determine
whether the Shopping Kart test applied to the instant case.
G. General Knit of California, Inc.
Shopping Kart's life was shortlived. In December, 1978, the Board
by a margin of three to two reversed itself and discarded Shopping Kart83
in favor of the Hollywood Ceramics."'
In General Knit,8' the employer filed two objections to the conduct
of the union during the time period immediately preceding the election. The
employer alleged that the union destroyed the laboratory conditions necessary
for the employees to make a free and fair choice at the polls. Misconduct
alleged regard the distribution of a leaflet which contain material mis-
representations concerning the financial condition of the company. 8 "
The leaflet contained statements regarding the profits and language
exemplified by the following:
WHO IS FOOLING WHO???
GENERAL KNIT CAN CRY POOR MOUTH IF THEY WANT,
BUT LET'S LOOK AT THE FACTS.
IN 1976, GENERAL KNIT HAD SALES OF $25 MILLION.
GENERAL KNIT IS OWNED BY ITOH WHO HAS A NET WORTH
IN EXCESS OF $200 MILLION.
180 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (December 8, 1978). The Board in General
Knit did not indicate whether the decision to readopt Hollywood Ceramics applies retroactive-
ly. Now the Board and the Courts will have to decide whether Hollywood Ceramics should
be applied to cases arising during the time Shopping Kart was viable.
1561 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1977).
182 Id. at 1119. Note that the court did indicate that under Hollywood Ceramics the election
should be vacated while under Shopping Kart the election results would be sustained. See
N.L.R.B. v. Spring Road Corp., 577 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1978) where the court in footnote
1 stated that evidence that fails to meet Hollywood Ceramics cannot satisfy the narrower
Shopping Kart rule, and, therefore, there is not need to consider Shopping Kart in deciding
this type of case.
183 228 N.L.R.B. at 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
184 140 N.L.R.B. at 221, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1600.
185 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (December 8, 1978).
186 Id. The union claimed profits for 1976 were $19.3 million. Actually the company incurred
a loss of approximately five million.
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THIS COMPANY HAD AN INCREASE OF 12.5 % IN SALES FOR
PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 1977.
DURING THIS PERIOD THIS COMPANY HAD A PROFIT OF
$19.3 MILLION.
DON'T BE FOOLED BY GENERAL KNIT AND THEIR HIGH
PRICE LAWYERS.
ITOH WHO OWNS GENERAL KNIT IS MAKING IT BIG AND
CAN AFFORD DECENT WAGES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES.
VOTE YES, TODAY, AND MAKE THE COMPANY SHARE
SOME OF THEIR HIGH PROFITS WITH YOU-THE WORKER."S
T
The language objected to by the employer was what company had the $19.3
million profit. The union contended the language clearly referred to ITOH,
while the company claimed the union used language so as to infer General
Knit earned a $19.3 million profit.
The Acting Regional Director found no violation of the Act under
Shopping Kart. The Board agreed with this conclusion if the Shopping Kart
doctrine would continue to be adhered to. However, the Board reversed
itself and discarded Shopping Kart.
In reverting back to Hollywood Ceramics, the Board reasoned that
the old standard was able to preserve the integrity of the election process
because this standard acted as a deterrent for many years in the past.
Specifically, the Board noted Hollywood Ceramics provided a means of
redress for a doubting party as to the validity of election results. Moreover,
the Courts have consistently accepted the standard more favorably then
they had accepted the Shopping Kart doctrine. Even though the Board
only some 20 months earlier had accepted the idea of voter sophistication,
from this decision it appears that the Board errored in arriving at that
conclusion, or voter sophistication does not justify continued aherenced
to Shopping Kart. At any rate the present policy of the Board is to apply
Hollywood Ceramics to misrepresentation cases.
Members Penello and Murphy filed separate dissenting opinions. As
could be expected, 8 Member Penello vigorously attacked the rationale and
the effect of the use of the Hollywood Ceramics rule. Specifically he con-
tended that by readopting the Hollywood Ceramics test the election process
would be delayed several years in cases which should not even be brought
before the Board. Furthermore, the majority's decision will result in in-
creased litigation'89 once the appeals courts get involved as the Board's
187 Id. at 3.
188 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (December 8, 1978).
189id. The majority notes that 180 misrepresentation cases have been filed since the
adoption of Shopping Kart, and this figure is an indication that the Shopping Kart doctrine
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rate of success in the appellate process is only about 50%. Member Murphy
contended that the readoption of Hollywood Ceramics will result in un-
necessary delays and will thwart the ideas of speedy elections.
This issue is of paramount importance in the N.L.R.B. conducted
elections. Misrepresentations can arise in any and all of the other tactics
discussed in previous chapters. By misrepresenting the truth in some form,
either side avails itself of an excellent opportunity to be victorious at the
polls. As discussed previously, the results of an election can indeed be
far-reaching.
The future of misrepresentation issues is uncertain in light of the
Board's shift within 20 months from Hollywood Ceramics to Shopping Kart
and back to Hollywood Ceramics. The question prior to General Knit was
whether the Board would revert to its old policy of Hollywood Ceramics.
Now the question becomes whether the Board will in the future revert back
to Shopping Kart.
The labor community has been put in an uncomfortable situation,
participants in elections cannot really be sure what course the Board will
follow now. Several commentators 9 ' stated that the membership on the
Board may have a great deal to do with Board policy in this area. This
view supported by the change in membership in June, 1977, two months
after Shopping Kart was decided, and six months later Shopping Kart was
laid to rest.' 91 Another view is expressed by Jay S. Siegel, the Chairman
of the Labor Relations Law Section of the American Bar Association.
Mr. Siegel's proposal' combines the features of both Hollywood Ceramics
and Shopping Kart. His idea is to prohibit investigation by the Board of
misrepresentations occurring prior to 72 hours before the election period.
As to the period within 72 hours, Mr. Siegel feels that the election should
be set aside automatically if immense misrepresentation takes place. At
any rate, the policy of the Board is now once again the Hollywood Ceramics
doctrine, and it is too soon to tell exactly what the effect of General Knit
will be as to long range Board policies in the area of misrepresentations
during an election campaign.
is ineffective in reducing litigation. Note that this figure of 180 works out to approximately
120 cases per year. See also the partial dissent of Members Fanning and Jenkins, 239
N.L.R.B. at ........ (1978). These members argued that 300 to 400 cases are considered each
year under Hollywood Ceramics and that is an excellent investment.
19 ) See Union Election Campaigns at 53; See 46 U. CiN. L. Rnv. at 461.
'91239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1978).
192 See Union Election Campaigns at 55-58. Mr. Seigel cites five advantages to his proposal.
First, the Board will not have to judge the substantially and materiality factors. Second,
the 72 hour rule would give the other party adequate time to reply. Third, the employees
will be able to hear both sides. Fourth, the 72 hour rule will result in fewer elections being
set aside as the participants know of the danger of stating a misrepresentation within 72
hours of the elections. Fifth, less litigation will result and the finality of elections will
increase.
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CONCLUSION
In the past 30 to 40 years, the Board has attempted to lay down
guidelines for both management and unions to adhere to in conducting
themselves during a representation election. The Board has recognized
the far-reaching impact of a representation election in that it can effect the
relations between workers and management for many years to come. In
furthering a policy of giving the voters a fair and free choice at the polls,
the Board in supervising these elections will allow only a certain type of
conduct. The Board's task is to set forth guidelines to be followed. Further-
more, by lawing down these guidelines, the Board offers the parties to an
election a system under which they can operate legitimately without risking
objections being filed that would lengthen the process of choosing a repre-
sentative. It is not to either side's advantage to conduct themselves in
such a way so as to come under the Board's scrutiny and thereby create
an atmosphere of dissension while waiting for the Board's decision as to
alleged objections. The more advantageous course to follow is to conduct
the election under the Board's guidelines and to have the election results
certified immediately after the election.
JOHN D. FRISBY, JR.
THE BUYING AND SELLING OF HUMAN ORGANS
FROM THE LIVING:
WHY NOT?
I. INTRODUCTION
T ins ARTICLE will examine the propriety of establishing a system for
the sale of human organs, especially the kidney. Initially, the debilitat-
ing malady of end stage renal disease will be discussed as will the marginal
"cure" of the disease via hemodialysis. Next, the superior alternative to
dialysis, i.e., kidney transplantation will be discussed in two ways. First,
the current procedure of using living, related donors will be examined
as well as harvesting kidneys from cadaver "donors". Second, the practice
of transplantation will be explored for its ramifications to society and the
participants in the following areas: medicine, psychology, and the law.
As will be shown, the recipient, donor and the physician are affected by
the legal aspects of transplantation in many ways.
Then, the scarcity of the availability of life-saving organs under the
current procedures will be discussed. Next, a new alternative to current
practice, i.e., the sale of kidneys, will be considered as a solution to the
scarcity problem. As was done earlier with the current methods, this pro-
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